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As Roemer (1986) points out, things become more interesting once we include 
information. In this paper, following the line started by Jiménez-Gómez and 
Marco-Gil (2008), we define both a lower and an upper bounds on awards in the 
framework of the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem (Gadea et al. (2010)), 
which is an extended bankruptcy problem enriched with a Commonly Accepted 
Equity Principles set and the idea of treat everybody as evenly as possible (Dutta 
and Ray (1989) and Arin (2007), among others). Moreover, we contribute with 
the definition of the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive procedure, which 
consists on the recursive imposition of both bounds, providing a natural way of 
justifying the convex combination of bankruptcy rules. Specifically, we retrieve 
the midpoint of extreme and opposite well known ways of distributing the 
resource. Finally, we complete our analysis from the strategic viewpoint, 
obtaining similar results. 
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When agents face the problem of distributing a scarce resource, they can face it from
ad o u b l ev i e w p o i n t : a w a r d sa n dl o s s e s . I nt h ef o r m e rc a s ew ef o c u so nt h ea m o u n t
of awards that we get. For instance, nowadays, most of the governments have assured
an amount of money deposited on the people’s bank accounts. In the latter case, we
are worry about the quantity of incurred losses, or, in other words, we concern on the
highest level of awards that we can obtain. For example, and returning to the previous
illustration, some governments have established an upper bound on the bank managers’
salaries. Therefore, it appears in a ‘natural’ way that, in these situations, each agent
should receive, not only, at least, a minimum amount according to all the rules which
satisfy some accorded equity properties, but also, no more than the maximum amount
provided by all these rules.
On the other hand, in Lerner’s [17] words: "People seem to have a strong desire
to believe in a just world." In this sense, as Schokkaert and Overlaet [24] points out,
in the vast literature on distributive justice we can ﬁnd two streams: the philosohers-
economists, and the psycologists-sociologists. The former line, which is more theoretical,
deﬁnes formal models trying to gather an acceptable interpretation of fair distributions.
The latter, more informal and descriptive, tries to explain the way in which people
perceives fairness, and their behavior when facing distribution problems. However,
Fairness hardly leads to a single viewpoint: the same distribution problem faced by two
diﬀerent societies, may, almost certainly, lead to the use of diﬀerent distributional rules
(Moulin [20], Schokkaert and Overlaet [24], Young [30], among others). In this sense,
trying to throw light on this issue, Roemer [23] says: "Things become more interesting
once we leave the restricted welfarist of bargaining framework and include information
on resources, preferences, needs, skills and so on."
To this respect, Gadea-Blanco et al. [11] and Jiménez-Gomez [15] join all the pre-
vious ideas to analyze thoroughly the consequences of enriching the classical model of
rationing with a third element, ,c a l l e dLegitimate Principles set, composed of basic
ethical principles commonly accepted by a society to resolve a concrete family of such
problems. Moreover, following Arin [2] and Dutta and Ray [10], among others, they
consider the idea that the general desirable social goal is to treat everybody as evenly
as possible, captured by the Lorenz criterion (Lorenz [18]).
In this paper, by using as starting point the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problems,
we propose the simultaneous combination of both a lower and an upper bounds on
awards, named Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive Process. This idea, although with
diﬀerences in the procedure, has been introduced in bargaining problems by Marco
et al. [19] with the deﬁnition of the Unanimous-Concession mechanism. At a ﬁrst
4step, their process guarantees to each agent the minimum amount according to a set
of agreed solutions, which would be the disagreement point at the following step, and
straightforwardly determine the maximum amount that each agent can receive, named
the ideal point.
Moreover, we show that the rule so obtained coincides with the average of the Lorenz-
Focal rules. This result has two consequences. Firstly, we provide a new justiﬁcation
of the convex combination of two extreme and opposite ways of distributing the en-
dowment. And, secondly, we obtain a new method which is invariant to the viewpoint
(gains and losses) used to ration the resources. This means, that our new approach
treats symmetrically the problem of ‘what is available’ and ‘what is missing’, i.e., the
rule so obtained is Self-Dual.
Finally, we apply these results to three diﬀerent Legitimate Principles sets, providing
new basis for the average of old bankruptcy rules.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the preliminaries. Section 3
provides our new approach. Section 4 gathers our main results and applies them on
diﬀerent Legitimate Principles sets. Section 5 analyzes the strategical model. Section 6
summarizes our conclusions. Finally, the Appendices gathers technical proofs.
2. Preliminaries.
A bankruptcy problem is a pair () ∈ R+ ×R
+ where  denotes the endowment
and  is the vector of each agents’ claim, ,f o re a c h ∈   = {1} such




For notational convenience, B will denote the set of all bankruptcy problems;  the
sum of the agents’ claims,  =
P
∈
;a n d the total amount of losses to distribute
among the agents,  =  − .
In this context, a rule is a function,  : B → R
+ such that for each () ∈ B (a) P
∈
()= (eﬃciency) and (b) 0 ≤ () ≤  for each  ∈  (non-negativity
and claim-boundedness).
Particularly, we focus on the following rules. The ﬁrst one recommends equal awards
to all claimants subject to no-one receiving more than her claim.
The Constrained Equal Awards rule, CEA, (Maimonides 12th Century, among





Next rule provides for each problem the awards that the Constrained Equal Awards
rule recommends for (2) when the endowment is less than the half-sum of the
5claims. Otherwise, each agent ﬁrst receives her half-claim, then the Constrained Equal
Awards rule is re-applied to the residual problem ( − 22).
Piniles’ rule, Pin, (Piniles [22]) provides, for each () ∈ B, the vector
(CEA(2))∈  if  ≤ 2; and (2+CEA( − 22))∈  if  ≥ 2
The following rule is inspired by the Uniform one (Sprumont [25]), a solution to the
problem of fair division when the preferences are single-peaked. It makes the minimal
adjustment in the formula of the Uniform rule, taking the half-claims as the peaks and
guaranteeing that awards are ordered in the same way as claims are.
The Constrained Egalitarian rule, CE, (Chun et al. [5]) chooses,
for each () ∈ B, the vector (CEA(2))∈  if  ≤ 2; and
(max{2min{}})∈  if  ≥ 2 where  is chosen so that P
∈
CE()=
Given a rule  for each () ∈ B and each  ∈  its dual,  assigns losses in
t h es a m ew a ya s assigns gains (Aumann and Maschler [1]), 
()= − ().
In this regard, we obtain that the Constrained Equal Losses rule,C E L ,(Aumann and
Maschler [1]), the Dual of Piniles’ rule, DPin,a n dt h eDual of Constrained Egalitarian
rule, DCE,a r ed u a lo ft h eCEA,t h ePin and the CE rules, respectively.
Finally, the starting point of our next analysis is the extended problem proposed by
Gadea-Blanco et al. [11], called Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem, which is based on
the idea that a society requires both as general social goal to treat everybody as evenly
as possible, and that the allocation satisﬁes a Legitimate Principles set.
On the one hand, following Arin [2], Dutta and Ray [10], Cowell [6] and Lambert
[16], and with the aim of determining the two focal distribution rules, the discrepancy for
sharing the resources is considered by means of the existence of two ﬁxed rules based on
the Lorenz criterion. Two focus which gather the two most egalitarian rules according
to extreme and opposite ways of facing bankruptcy problems: gains and losses. We call
these two focus Lorenz-Focal rules, which are the Lorenz-Gains and Lorenz-Losses
Maximal rules satisfying , denoted by  and  respectively. Formally:
Let  =
©
 ∈ R :  ≥ 0
ª
, and for each vector  ∈  we denote by Π() the vector
that results from  by permuting the coordinates in such a way that Π1() ≤ Π2() ≤
 ≤ Π() Let  ∈ R,w es a yt h a t Lorenz dominates ,d e n o t e db y Â ,
if Π1() ≥ Π1() Π1()+Π2() ≥ Π1()+Π2() and so on, with at least one strict





 in order to apply the Lorenz domination criterion (see Arin [2]).
If the partial sums are equal for Π() and Π(), the two vectors,  and  are said
to be Lorenz equivalent, denoted by  ∼ 
6Moreover, a vector  ∈  is Lorenz Maximal if there is no other vector  ∈  such
that,  Â  And, particularly, given a set  ⊆ , a vector  ∈  is Lorenz Maximal
in  if there is no other vector  ∈  such that,  Â 
Finally, applying the Lorenz-criterion on the two focus, gains and losses, that ‘na-
turally’ arises in bankruptcy problems, we can deﬁne the concepts of Lorenz-Gains and
Lorenz-Losses domination.
Given two bankruptcy rules  and ,w es a yt h a t Lorenz-gains dominates  if for
each () ∈ B,  () Â  (). And a bankruptcy rule  is Lorenz-Gains Ma-
ximal, LGM, if there is no other  such that, for each () ∈ B, () Â  ()
Analogously,  Lorenz-losses dominates  if for each () ∈ B, ( −  ()) Â
( − ()) And a bankruptcy rule  is Lorenz-Losses Maximal, LLM if there
is no other  such that, for each () ∈ B ( −  ()) Â ( −  ())
On the other hand, we consider that a society agrees in a set of basic properties or
principles on which the distribution of the resource must be made in base of a Legitimate
Principles set. That is, these are problems where all the admissible rules must satisfy
the ‘Commonly Accepted Equity Principles’ set.
Therefore, the Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem is deﬁned as follows.
A Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem, ,i sat r i p l e t =
() where  =( ) ∈ B,  is a ﬁxed set of principles on which
a particular society has agreed, and both  and  are the Lorenz-Gains
and Lorenz-Losses Maximal rules satisfying  for each  ∈ B, respectively.
Henceforth,  denotes the set of all subsets of properties of rules. Each  ∈ 
represents a speciﬁc society which will always apply such principles for solving its prob-
lems; LB denotes the set of all Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem, Φ the set of all
rules and Φ() be the subset of Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rules in .
So that, a Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rule will be a rule satisfying  which re-
commends an allocation between the two Lorenz-Focal rules.T h a ti s ,
A Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rule on LB is a function
 : LB → R, such that for each Lorenz-Bifocal bankruptcy problem  ∈ LB, 
is a rule satisfying , associating for each  ∈  a part of the resources satisfying
min{
 ()





In this section, using the concept of the P-Safety (Jiménez-Gómez and Marco-Gil [13]),
we deﬁne a lower and an upper bound on awards, named the Lorenz P-Safety and Lorenz
7P-Ceiling, respectively. Particularly, the former corresponds with the smallest amount
that each agent could get according to the application of the Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible
rules. The latter ensures that each agent’s awards are conﬁned to the maximum amount
among the Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rules.F o r m a l l y :
















As we have mentioned, bankruptcy problems has been rewritten for losses by using
the idea of duality. In this regard, when focusing on losses, the starting point of our
m o d e lw i l lb et h eDual Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy problems. That is, given  ∈  and
() ∈ B, we consider the set of dual properties of  the problem of distributing the
losses () and the dual bankruptcy rules.
Given a Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem, ,t h eDual Lorenz-Bifocal
Bankruptcy problem, denoted by ()






¢) where  =( ) ∈ B,  is a ﬁxed set of principles





Lorenz-Gains and Lorenz-Losses Maximal rules satisfying  for each  ∈ B,r e s p e c -
tively.
Note that, whenever the accorded properties are Self-Dual, if we focussed on losses
instead of awards, an alternative way of understanding this limit would be as a lower
bound on losses, i.e., for each () ∈ LB the Lorenz P-Ceiling,f o re a c h ∈  is














Therefore, the Lorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling are dual, a fact that will
be used later on.
To this regard, as we have seen, there are everyday situations in which a society
obtains an agreement on the properties which deﬁne the way of rationing the endowment,
8and then decides that each agent should receive, at least, a minimum amount, and, at
most, a maximum amount according to all the Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rules. With
these ideas in mind, we deﬁne the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive Process as
the procedure in which at each step, every agent’s claim is truncated by her Lorenz
P-Ceiling, and each of them receives her Lorenz P-Safety.
Deﬁnition 3.3. Given  ∈ N the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive












(1 1) ≡ () and for  ≥ 2







 ) − (−1
 )
According to this process, an agent will get at the ﬁrst step her Lorenz P-Safety
of the original problem. At the second step, we redeﬁne a residual problem, in which
the endowment consists on the remaining resources and each agent’s claim is truncated
by her Lorenz P-Ceiling, and then adjusted down by the amount received. Then each
agent receives her Lorenz P-Safety of this residual problem, and so on. We can easily see
that this process is not always eﬃcient, but when it does, we call it the Lorenz Double
Recursive rule.F o r m a l l y :
Deﬁnition 3.4. The Lorenz Double Recursive rule, , associates for each





















Note that this rule will be a Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rule whenever it fulﬁlls the
Legitimate Principles set on which the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive Process
is based. A fact that, as we will see later, cannot be always guaranteed.
94. Main results and applications.
This section presents a general result and its application on three Legitimate Principles
sets.
Firstly, next theorem establishes that, whenever the properties selected are Self-
Dual,t h eﬁnal allocation provided by the Lorenz Double Recursive rule will correspond
with the average of the lower and upper bounds for each Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy
Problem,i . e . ,t h eLorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling.






Proof. The proof of this result is based on two lemmas and a remark.
The ﬁrst lemma shows that, in any step  ∈ N, 1 the sum of the Lorenz
P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling coincides with the sum of the claims.









Proof. Let  ∈ LB such that  is Self-Dual and  ∈ N1 Note that for














Then, by the deﬁnitions of the Lorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling,t h e s et w o
rules deﬁne the Lorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling of each agent for a set of















Moreover, by their dual relation, for each agent we are adding the two Lorenz-Focal










10Finally, we know that





























by the deﬁnition of the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive Process q.e.d.
The following remark is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.2 and it says that for each
Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problem, and at any step  ∈ N  1 t h eh a l fo ft h e
claims sum at every step of the Lorenz Double Boundedness Recursive Process coincides
with both the endowment and the total loss at every step of the process.
Remark 1. For each () ∈ LB such that  is Self-Dual and  ∈ N  1
 =  = 2
Proof. Let  ∈ LB such that  is Self-Dual and 1 ∈ N We know that,
 =  −  By Lemma 4.2,  = 2 Therefore,  =  − 2=2
q.e.d.
The second lemma says that, each agent’s claim at each step diﬀerent of the initial
one coincides with sum of both the lower and upper bound on awards.





Proof. Let  ∈ LB such that  is Self-Dual,f o re a c h ∈ ,a n de a c h
1 ∈ N by Remark 1 we know that for 1 ∈ N  =  so, (
)=
(()
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Therefore, the next result, which follows straightforwardly from Theorem 4.1, shows
that the Lorenz Double Recursive rule for  can be deﬁned as the average of the
associated Lorenz-Focal rules.





A direct consequence of the above proposition is that the Lorenz Double Recursive
rule not only is always well deﬁned, i.e. satisﬁes eﬃciency, non-negativity and claim-
boundedness, but it also satisﬁes Self-Duality (Yeh and Thomson [27]), which means
that it provides the same allocation of the endowment when distributing awards or
losses.
Moreover, with this result we retrieve the convex combination of the two extreme
Lorenz-Focal rules. Particularly, the Lorenz Double Recursive rule proposes the mid-
point between the two rules which represent extreme and opposite ways of sharing
awards among claimants according to the imposed requirements. So, in other words,
it could be said that the rationing of the endowment obtained by the recursive double
imposition of the Lorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling neither favor nor hurts to
any agent in particular. Following Yeh and Thomson [27]:
‘When two rules express opposite viewpoints on how to solve a bankruptcy
problem, it is natural to compromise between them by averaging’.
Finally, next remark provides a generalization of previous results.
Remark 2. For any problem such that there exist two Focal rules, which are dual each
other, the ﬁnal allocation provided by the Double Recursive rule will correspond with
the average of these two Focal rules.
Note that in this case we consider the Double Recursive r u l ea st h ep r o c e d u r ew e r e
each agent receives the smallest amount according to these focus and her claim is trun-
cated by the highest amount recommended by both of them.
4.1. Applications.
In this context, we consider three possible choices of the ‘Commonly Accepted Equity
Principles’ set that a society could require on the rules, taking into account that the
introduced properties have been understood by many authors as minimal requirements
of fairness (see for instance Thomson [26]).
13Speciﬁcally, we consider the following Legitimate Principles sets,
1 ={Eﬃciency, Claim-boundedness and Non-Negativity},
2 = 1∪{Resource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and Midpoint Property}, and
3 = 1∪{Resource Monotonicity and Midpoint Property}.
Let us dwell on the meaning of the proposed principles.
Resource Monotonicity (Curiel et al. [7], Young [31], among others) demands that
if the endowment increases, then all individuals should get at least what they received
initially.
Resource Monotonicity: for each () ∈ B and each 0 ∈ R+ such that 
0  then (0) ≥ () for each  ∈ 
Order Preservation (Aumann and Maschler [1]) requires respecting the ordering of
the claims: if agent i’s claim is at least as large as agent j’s claim, he should receive and
loss at least as much as agent  does respectively.
Order Preservation: for each () ∈ B,a n de a c h ∈ , such that  ≥ ,
then () ≥ () and  − () ≥  − () that is () ≥ ()
A Super-Modular rule (Dagan et al. [8]) allocates each additional dollar in an ‘order
preserving’ manner. In other words, when the endowment increases, agents with higher
claims receive a greater part of the increment than those with lower claims.
Super-Modularity: for each () ∈ B all 0 ∈ R+ and each  ∈  such that
 0 and  ≥  then (0) − () ≥ (0) − ()
Midpoint Property (Chun, Schummer and Thomson [5]) requires that if the estate
is equal to the sum of the half-claims, then all agents should receive their half-claim.
Midpoint Property: for each () ∈ B and each  ∈  if  = 2 then
()=2.
At this point, Lorenz comparisons of bankruptcy rules from the gains viewpoint can
be found in Bosmans and Lauwers [3] and in Thomson [28]. This fact together duality
let us to know the Lorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling for  ∈ {1 2 3}.T h a t
14is, (see Jiménez-Gómez [15]) the Lorenz-Focal rules that mark out the region of Lorenz-
Bifocal Admissible rules for 1, 2,a n d3, are the pairs () ()
and () respectively. So, Lorenz-Bifocal Bankruptcy Problems for each of these
principles sets are well-deﬁned, being their elements triplets, such that, for each () ∈
B
1 =( ( ))
2 =( ( ))
3 =( ( ))
Graphically, Figures 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 represent the two bounds for bi-personal
problems with  ∈ {1 2 3}.
Particularly, the black line represents the estate (). The blue and the green lines
show the Lorenz-Focal rules marking out the area of all the admissible path of awards
satisfying the properties in 1, 2,a n d3 That is, the green and the blue solid lines
are the CEL the CEA rules for 1,t h eDPin and Pin rules for 2,a n dt h eDCE and

















































Figure 4.2: Lorenz P-Safety and Lorenz P-Gain for 2.
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Figure 4.4: Lorenz P-Safety and Lorenz P-Gain for 3 (case b).
Concluding this section, we apply the result in Theorem 4.1 to the three diﬀerent
Legitimate Principles sets mentioned previously.
Corollary 4.5. For each 1 ∈ LB, 1 =( ( )) the Lorenz Dou-
ble Recursive rule is the average of the Constrained Equal Awards and the
Constrained Equal Losses rules.
Corollary 4.6. For each 2 ∈ LB, 2 =( ( )) the Lorenz Double
Recursive rule is the average of Piniles’ and the Dual of Piniles’ rules.
Corollary 4.7. For each 3 ∈ LB, 3 =( ( )) the Lorenz Double
Recursive rule is the average of the Constrained Egalitarian and the
Dual Constrained Egalitarian rules.
Note that these corollaries imply that the allocation proposed by our new procedure
is Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible with  ∈ {1 2 3} since, by Yeh and Thomson [27],
the Lorenz Double Recursive rule preserves Resource Monotonicity, Super-Modularity
and the Midpoint property.
However, the Lorenz Double Recursive rule fails some properties, even when the two
Lorenz-Focal rules fulﬁll them (Yeh and Thomson [27]), such that Composition Down
(Moulin [21]), Composition Up (Young [30]), and Consistency (Young [30]). Then, it
is not possible to ensure that the ﬁnal allocation were Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible when
17u s e sa tt h es a m et i m ea n dr e c u r s i v e l yt h eLorenz P-Safety and the Lorenz P-Ceiling.
F o re x a m p l e ,w ec a ns e et h a ti fw ea d dt ot h es e t1 the property of Consistency, the
two Lorenz-Focal rules remain the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal
Losses rules, but the average of these Lorenz Admissible r u l e sd o e sn o ts a t i s f yo n eo ft h e
initial properties. Then, the natural question is ‘Would a society have any argument
to apply this new rule?’ The answer could be aﬃrmative since, although a society
could have reasons to not agree on applying the result of the Lorenz Double Recursive
rule, since it may fail some properties, this way of distribute the endowment has been
defended by many authors as a natural way to agree on a ‘middle’ allocation between
two extreme ways of rationing (see, for instance, Yeh and Thomson [27]). Moreover,
another reason to use this method is that we know exactly the result of the procedure
and the properties which are satisﬁed by the ﬁnal allocation.
5. An strategic view.
Next, we analyze the previous model from a strategical point of view. Concretely, we
deﬁne a new mechanism which combines the philosophy of the Diminishing Claims
(Chun [4]) and the Unanimous Concessions (Herrero [12]) procedures, using the fact
that they are dual.
This new method, named the Double Concessions procedure, says that since agents
have chosen their preferred rules, if at the initial step there is no agreement, at the
second step, each agent receives the smallest amount among all the proposed at step
1. (Unanimous Concessions). Now, we redeﬁne the residual bankruptcy problem, in
which the endowment is the leftover resources, and the claims are truncated by the
maximum amount recommended (Diminishing Claims ) by all the suggested rules and
adjusted down by the amounts just given. Then, the procedure is again applied until
an agreement is reached. If this is not the case, the solution will be the limit of the
procedure if it is feasible, and zero otherwise. Formally:
Deﬁnition 5.1. Double Concessions procedure, :
Let  ∈ LB.A tt h eﬁrst stage, each agent chooses a rule  ∈ Φ() The
proposal of the Double Concessions procedure, [] is obtained as follows:
[Step 1] If all agents agree on () then []= Otherwise, go
to next step.
[Step 2] Let us deﬁne










2 = () − ()
182 =  −
P
∈













Otherwise, go to next step.











































































 Otherwise, go to next step.













 ≤  []= Otherwise, []=0 
From now on, let Γ
 denote the game induced by the Double Concessions proce-
dure when agents acts strategically, in which the set of players is  the strategies for
each agent are rules in Φ() and the payoﬀs are the sum of the amounts received




















where  denotes the step where the agreement is reached, and ∞ otherwise.
Next theorem shows the main result when applying the Double Concessions proce-
dure in .
Theorem 5.2. In any Nash equilibrium induced by the game Γ
 such that  is
Self-Dual, each agent receives the amount given by the average of the two Lorenz-Focal
rules.
Proof.- Let  ∈ LB such that  is Self-Dual.
19By Theorem 4.1 we know that whenever each claimant’s Lorenz P-Safety and Lorenz
P-Ceiling corresponds with the amount recommending by one of the two Lorenz-Focal
rules, then all the agents receive the amount given by the average of the two Lorenz-Focal
rules.
Moreover, by the deﬁnition of the Double Concessions procedure can easily note that
the Lorenz-Gains Maximal rule is a weakly dominant strategy for the smallest agent, and
the Lorenz-Losses Maximal rule is a weakly dominant strategy for the highest claimant.
Thus, for each  ∈ 
(

















Therefore by Theorem 4.1,


















Consequently, next results are straightforwardly obtained by applying Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. In any Nash equilibrium induced by the game Γ
1 each agent re-
ceives the amount given by the average of the Constrained Equal Awards and the Con-
strained Equal Losses rules.
Corollary 5.4. In any Nash equilibrium induced by the game Γ
2 each agent re-
ceives the amount given by the average of Piniles’ and the Dual of Piniles’ rules.
Corollary 5.5. In any Nash equilibrium induced by the game Γ
3 each agent re-
ceives the amount given by the average of the Constrained Egalitarian and the Dual
Constrained Egalitarian rules.
As pointed out in the previous section, the convex combination of rules preserves Re-
source Monotonicity, Super-Modularity and the Midpoint properties (Yeh and Thomson
[27]). Hence, as theses corollaries show, our new procedure is Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible
for  ∈ {1 2 3} while applying independently the Diminishing Claims and the
Unanimous Concessions fail Resource Monotonicity (see Jiménez-Gómez [14]).
206. Conclusions.
In this paper we have deﬁned a new method for distributing the endowment, using the
idea of recursively guaranteeing ‘fair’ minimum and maximum amounts to each agent
in bankruptcy problems, named the Lorenz Double Recursive rule.
In this context, our main result states that the Lorenz Double Recursive rule corre-
sponds with the average of the two extreme Lorenz-Bifocal Admissible rules,i m p l y i n g
that our new rule retrieves an allocation which coincides with the midpoint between the
rule that favors the highest claimant and the other one that favors the lowest agent, i.e.,
we obtain new justiﬁcations for the convex combination of rules. Then, we particularize
this procedure to some Legitimate Principles sets proposed which have been interpreted
by many authors as ‘basic’ requirements, recovering the average of old and well-known
rules. Moreover, we have shown that our process does not guarantee that the ﬁnal
allocation were admissible.
Finally, we have obtained similar results when applying this methodology in the
strategical framework. In this line, we deﬁne a new mechanism, named the Double Con-
cessions procedure, combining the Diminishing Claims (Chun [4]) and the Unanimous
Concessions (Herrero [12]) procedures. Thus, we have justiﬁed from an axiomatic and
a non-cooperative point of view the convex combination of rules.
21References
[1] Aumann, R., Maschler, M.: Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from
the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory 36, 195—213 (1985).
[2] Arin, J: Egalitarian distributions in coalitional models. International Game Theory
Review 9, 1, 47-57 (2007).
[3] Bosmans, K., Lauwers, L: Lorenz comparisons of nine rules for the adjudication
of conﬂicting claims. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. CES Discussion Paper 07.05
(2007).
[4] Chun, Y: A non-cooperative justiﬁcation for egalitarian surplus sharing. Mathe-
matical Social Sciences 17, 245-261 (1989).
[5] Chun, Y., Schummer, J., Thomson, W: Constrained Egalitarianism: a new solution
to bankruptcy problems. Seoul Journal of Economics 14, 269-297 (2001).
[6] Cowell, F.A: Measurement of inequality. In Atkinson, A., and Bourguignon, F.
(Eds), Handbook of income distribution I, pp. 87-166. Elsevier, Amsterdamn
(2000).
[7] Curiel, I., Maschler, M., Tijs, S.H: Bankruptcy games. Zeitschrift für Operations
Research 31, A143—A159 (1987).
[ 8 ]D a g a n ,N . ,S e r r a n o ,R .V o l i j ,O :An o n - c o operative view of consistent bankruptcy
rules. Games and Economic Behavior 18, 55-72 (1997).
[9] Dominguez, D: Lower bounds and recursive methods for the problem of adjudi-
cating conﬂicting claim. Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (2007). CIE
Discussion Paper Series 07-05.
[10] Dutta, B., Ray, D: A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints.
Econometrica 57, 615-635 (1989).
[11] Gadea-Blanco, P., Jiménez-Gómez, J.M., Marco-Gil, M.C: Some game-theoretic
grounds for meeting people half-way. A discussion WP-AD 2010-04, Instituto Va-
lenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (2010).
[12] Herrero, C: Equal awards versus equal losses: duality in bankruptcy. In M.R. Sertel
and S. Koray (eds), Advances in Economic Design, pp. 413-426. Springer-Verlag,
Berlin (2003).
22[13] Jiménez-Gómez, J.M., Marco-Gil, M.C: A new approach for bounding awards in
bankruptcy problems. A discussion WP-AD 2008-07, Instituto Valenciano de In-
vestigaciones Económicas (2008).
[14] Jiménez-Gómez, J.M: Noncooperative justiﬁcations for old bankruptcy rules. A
discussion WP-AD 2010-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas
(2010).
[15] Jiménez-Gómez, J.M: Why does virtue lie in the middle ground? Rationing prob-
lems with Legitimate Principles. Master Thesis, Universidad Politécnica de Carta-
gena (2010).
[16] Lambert, P.J: The distribution and redistribution of income: A mathematical
analysis. Manchester University Press, Manchester (2001).
[17] Lerner, M.J: The justice motive in social behavior: introduction. Journal of Social
Issues 31, 1-19 (1975).
[18] Lorenz, M: Methods of measuring the concentration of wealth. Publications of the
American Statistical Association 9, 209-219 (1905).
[ 1 9 ]M a r c o ,M . C . ,P e r i s ,J .a n dS u b i z a ,B :Amechanism for meta-bargaining problems.
A discussion WP-AD 98-17 (1995).
[20] Moulin, H: Axiomatic of Cooperative Decisions Making. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge (1988).
[21] Moulin, H: Priority rules and other asymmetric rationing methods. Econometrica
68, 643-684 (2000).
[22] Piniles, H.M.: Drkah shel Torah. Forester, Viena. (1861).
[23] Roemer, J: The mismarriage of bargaining theory and distributive justice. Ethics
73, 88-110 (1986).
[24] Schokkaert, E., Overlaet, E: Moral Intuitions and Economic Models of Distributive
Justice. Social Choice and Welfare 6, 19-31 (1989).
[25] Sprumont, Y: The division problem with single-peaked preferences: a characteri-
zation of the uniform allocation rule. Econometrica 49, 509—519 (1991).
[26] Thomson, W: Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation
problems: a survey. Mathematical Social Sciences 45, 249-297 (2003).
23[27] Thomson, W., Yeh, C.H: Operators for the adjudication of conﬂicting claims. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 143, 177-198 (2008).
[28] Thomson, W: Lorenz Ranking of rules for adjudication of conﬂicting claims. Work-
ing Paper N 538. Rochester Center for Economic Research. University of Rochester
(2007).
[29] Thomson, W: Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Academic Press.
(Forthcoming).
[30] Young, P: On dividing an amount according to individual claims or liabilities.
Mathematics of Operations Research 12, 398-414 (1987).








WP-AD 2010-01  “Scaling methods for categorical self-assessed health measures” 
  P. Cubí-Mollá. January 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-02  “Strong ties in a small world” 
  M.J. van der Leij, S. Goyal. January 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-03  “Timing of protectionism” 
A. Gómez-Galvarriato, C.L. Guerrero-Luchtenberg. January 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-04  “Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way” 
  P.Gadea-Blanco, J.M. Jiménez-Gómez, M.C. Marco-Gil. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-05  “Sequential city growth: empirical evidence” 
A.   Cuberes. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-06  “Preferences, comparative advantage, and compensating wage differentials for job routinization” 
C.   Quintana-Domeque. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-07  “The diffusion of Internet: a cross-country analysis” 
  L. Andrés, D. Cuberes, M.A. Diouf, T. Serebrisky. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-08  “How endogenous is money? Evidence from a new microeconomic estimate” 
D.   Cuberes, W.R. Dougan. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-09  “Trade liberalization in vertically related markets” 
  R. Moner-Colonques, J.J. Sempere-Monerris, A. Urbano. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-10  “Tax evasion as a global game (TEGG) in the laboratory” 
  M. Sánchez-Villalba. February 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-11  “The effects of the tax system on education decisions and welfare” 
    L.A. Viianto. March 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-12  “The pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of job displacement. The risky job of getting back to work” 
  R. Leombruni, T. Razzolini, F. Serti. March 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-13  “Self-interest and justice principles” 
I. Rodríguez-Lara, L. Moreno-Garrido. March 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-14  “On spatial equilibria in a social interaction model” 
  P. Mossay, P.M. Picard. March 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-15  “Noncooperative justifications for old bankruptcy rules” 
  J.M. Jiménez-Gómez. March 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-16  “Anthropometry and socioeconomics in the couple: evidence from the PSID” 
  S. Oreffice, C. Quintana-Domeque. April 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-17  “Differentiated social interactions in the US schooling race gap” 
  L.J. Hall. April 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-18  “Things that make us different: analysis of variance in the use of time” 
  J. González Chapela. April 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-19  “The role of program quality and publicly-owned platforms in the free to air broadcasting industry” 
  M. González-Maestre, F. Martínez-Sánchez. June 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-20  “Direct pricing of retail payment methods: Norway vs. US” 
  F. Callado, J. Hromcová, N. Utrero. June 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-21  “Sexual orientation and household savings. Do homosexual couples save more? 
  B. Negrusa, S. Oreffice. June 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-22  “The interaction of minimum wage and severance payments in a frictional labor market: theory and 
 estimation” 
  C. Silva. June 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-23  “Fatter attraction: anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market” 
  P.A. Chiappori, S. Oreffice, C. Quintana-Domeque. June 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-24  “Consumption, liquidity and the cross-sectional variation of expected returns” 
  E. Márquez, B. Nieto, G. Rubio. July 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-25  “Limited memory can be beneficial for the evolution of cooperation” 
  G. Horváth, J. Kovárík, F. Mengel. July 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-26  “Competition, product and process innovation: an empirical analysis” 
  C.D. Santos. July 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-27  “A new prospect of additivity in bankruptcy problems” 
  J. Alcalde, M.C. Marco-Gil, J.A. Silva. July 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-28  “Diseases, infection dynamics and development” 
  S. Chakraborty, C. Papageorgiou, F. Pérez Sebastián. September 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-29  “Why people reach intermediate agreements? Axiomatic and strategic justification” 
  J.M. Jiménez-Gómez. September 2010. 
WP-AD 2010-30  “Mobbing and workers’ health: an empirical analysis for Spain” 
  M.A. Carnero, B. Martínez, R. Sánchez-Mangas. September 2010. 
                              
     
* Please contact Ivie's Publications Department to obtain a list of publications previous to 2010. Ivie
Guardia Civil, 22 - Esc. 2, 1º
46020 Valencia - Spain
Phone: +34 963 190 050
Fax: +34 963 190 055
Department of Economics
University of Alicante
Campus San Vicente del Raspeig
03071 Alicante - Spain
Phone: +34 965 903 563
Fax: +34 965 903 898
Website: www.ivie.es
E-mail: publicaciones@ivie.es
ad
serie